### 1NC

#### Restriction is a prohibition on action – the aff is not

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

Interp – Topical affs must increase STATUTORY and/ or JUDICIAL restrictions.

#### Statutory restrictions are controls or limits imposed by the legislative body

Blacks Online Legal Dictionary 13

(2nd Edition, http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/)

Statutory Restriction- Limits or controls that have been place on activities by its ruling legislation.

#### Judicial belongs to court of law

Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University

(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/101916?redirectedFrom=judicial+#eid)

Of or belonging to judgment in a court of law, or to a judge in relation to this function; pertaining to the administration of justice; proper to a court of law or a legal tribunal; resulting from or fixed by a judgment in court.

#### War powers authority is defined by statute

Kinkopf 7 – Professor of Law @ GSU

(Neil, “THE CONGRESS AS SURGE PROTECTOR,” http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Kinkopf-Surge.pdf)

This understanding of the President’s power as Commander in Chief is plain enough ¶ from the text of the Constitution itself. It has also been the consistent interpretation of ¶ the Courts. Chief Justice John Marshall set forth this interpretation in a series of cases ¶ arising from the naval war with France. Most notably, in Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice ¶ Marshall held that the President’s war powers are defined by statute and may not exceed ¶ statutory limits.

Violation - the aff isn't even trying.

At best they are effects T because they only investigate the stories and experiences of those AFFECTED by presidential war powers, not the war powers themselves.

a.) Limits- no stable interpretation of what they defend explodes the topic which undermines research and clash.

b.) Bidirectionality - They can skirt core topic controversy of presidential war powers authority by only arguing about the effects.

### Cap

The aff reduces class analysis to a "one of many" in difference politics - this rhetorical strategy ignores the structural productions of the very forces they criticize.

-Plurality

-Social Production of Difference

-Relations of Production b4 Discourse

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, post-Marxists tend to assume that the principal political points of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world must necessarily be ‘cultural.’ As such, most, but not all post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ which is largely premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in the arrangement and deployment of subjectivity in cultural and ideological practices (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). Advocates of 'difference’ politics therefore posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural conﬁgurations. However, post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized;’ in others, class is summoned only as part of the triumvirate of ‘race, class, and gender’ in which class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ and seemingly blind to the ‘economic,’ the rhetorical excesses of post-Marxists have also prevented them from considering the stark reality of contemporary class conditions under global capitalism. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘difference’ has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and, in some cases, completely ignoring the economic and material dimensions of difference. This posturing has been quite evident in many ‘post-al’ theories of ‘race’ and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 cultural studies that have valorized an account of difference—particularly ‘racial difference’—in almost exclusively ‘superstructuralist’ terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of ‘difference’ and claims about ‘the “relative autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a reduction and distortion of Marxian class analysis’ which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure.’ It is then ‘relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations the ‘cultural’ is treated as a separate and autonomous sphere, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of these ‘culturalist’ narratives have produced autonomist and reiﬁed conceptualizations of difference which ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ have, in effect, reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with (negotiated) on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production’ (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that arguing that ‘culture’ is generally conditioned/shaped by material forces does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably ‘deterministic**’** base/superstructure metaphor **which** has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. Rather, we invoke Marx’s own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he contends that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This emphasizes Marx’s understanding of capitalism and capital as a ‘social’ relation—one which stresses the interpenetration of these categories, the realities which they reﬂect, and one which therefore offers a uniﬁed and dialectical analysis of history, ideology, culture, politics, economics and society (see also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ and ‘representational’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation and struggle. We readily acknowledge the signiﬁcance of contemporary theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘difference’ that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities. However, they have also tended to redeﬁne politics as a signifying activity generally conﬁned to the realm of ‘representation’ while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization. In their rush to avoid the ‘capital’ sin of ‘economism,’ many post-Marxists (who often ignore their own class privilege) have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism which holds, among other things, that cultural struggles external to class organizing provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics.3 In many respects, this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens (Turner, 1994, p. 410). We do not discount concerns over representation; rather our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that culturalist arguments are deeply problematic both in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing (yes totalizing!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class. In a proper historical materialist account, ‘culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts.4 ‘Post-al’ theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. ‘Difference’ needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. We need to acknowledge that ‘otherness’ and/or difference is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced. In other words, since systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in speciﬁc contexts. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (1) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) how differences are produced out of, and lived within speciﬁc historical formations.5 Moreover, it presents a challenge to those theorizations that work to consolidate ‘identitarian’ understandings of difference based exclusively on questions of cultural or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). In this regard, much of what is called the ‘politics of difference’ is little more than a demand for inclusion into the club of representation —a posture which reinscribes a neo-liberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free-market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their ‘different’ cultural goods. What advocates of this approach fail to address is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to ﬂourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics (including those based on ‘race’) cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices, and cannot capture the ways in which various manifestations of oppression are intimately connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation. An historical materialist approach understands that categories of ‘difference’ are social/political constructs that are often encoded in dominant ideological formations and that they often play a role in ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ state-mediated forms of ruling. It also acknowledges the ‘material’ force of ideologies—particularly racist ideologies—that assign separate cultural and/or biological essences to different segments of the population which, in turn, serve to reinforce and rationalize existing relations of power. But more than this, an historical materialist understanding foregrounds the manner in which ‘difference’ is central to the exploitative production/ reproduction dialectic of capital, its labor organization and processes, and in the way labor is valued and renumerated.

The aff thinks that more narratives more stories is what we need - continued elaborations of the experience of the oppressed. That strategy results in an inversion of hierarchy whereby they invest themselves in that system of suffering.

Gitlin 97—sociology, Columbia (Todd, The anti-political populism of cultural studies, Dissent; Spring, Vol. 44, Iss. 2; p 77, ProQuest)

From the late 1960s onward, as I have said, the insurgent energy was to be found in movements that aimed to politicize specific identities-racial minorities, women, gays. If the "collective behavior" school of once-conventional sociology had grouped movements in behalf of justice and democratic rights together with fads and fashions, cultural studies now set out to separate movements from fads, to take seriously the accounts of movement participants themselves, and thereby to restore the dignity of the movements only to end up, in the 1980s, linking movements with fads by finding equivalent dignity in both spheres, so that, for example, dressing like Madonna might be upgraded to an act of "resistance" equivalent to demonstrating in behalf of the right to abortion, and watching a talk show on family violence was positioned on the same plane. In this way, cultural studies extended the New Left symbiosis with popular culture. Eventually, the popular culture of marginal groups (punk, reggae, disco, feminist poetry, hip-hop) was promoted to a sort of counterstructure of feeling, and even, at the edges, a surrogate politics-a sphere of thought and sensibility thought to be insulated from the pressures of hegemonic discourse, of instrumental reason, of economic rationality, of class, gender, and sexual subordination. The other move in cultural studies was to claim that culture continued radical politics by other means. The idea was that cultural innovation was daily insinuating itself into the activity of ordinary people. Perhaps the millions had not actually been absorbed into the hegemonic sponge of mainstream popular culture. Perhaps they were freely dissenting. If "the revolution" had receded to the point of invisibility, it would be depressing to contemplate the victory of a hegemonic culture imposed by strong, virtually irresistible media. How much more reassuring to detect "resistance" saturating the pores of everyday life! In this spirit, there emerged a welter of studies purporting to discover not only the "active" participation of audiences in shaping the meaning of popular culture, but the "resistance" of those audiences to hegemonic frames of interpretation in a variety of forms-news broadcasts (Dave Morley, The `Nationwide ' Audience, 1980); romance fiction (Janice Radway, Reading the Romance, 1984); television fiction (Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, The Export of Meaning, 1990; Andrea Press, Women Watching Television, 1991); television in general (John Fiske, Television Culture, 1987); and many others. Thus, too, the feminist fascination with the fictions and talk shows of daytime "women's television"-in this view, the dismissal of these shows as "trivial," "banal," "soap opera," and so on, follows from the patriarchal premise that what takes place within the four walls of the home matters less than what takes place in a public sphere established (not coincidentally) for the convenience of men. Observing the immensity of the audiences for Oprah Winfrey and her legions of imitators, many in cultural studies upended the phenomenon by turning the definitions around. The largely female audiences for these shows would no longer be dismissed as distracted voyeurs, but praised as active participants in the exposure and therefore politicizing of crimes like incest, spousal abuse, and sexual molestation. These audiences would no longer be seen simply as confirming their "normality" with a safe, brief, well bounded, vicarious acquaintanceship with deviance. They could be understood as an avant-garde social movement. Above all, in a word, cultural studies has veered into populism. Against the unabashed elitism of conventional literary and art studies, cultural studies affirms an unabashed populism in which all social activities matter, all can be understood, all contain cues to the social nature of human beings. The object of attention is certified as worthy of such not by being "the best that has been thought and said in the world" but by having been thought and said by or for "the people"-period. The popularity of popular culture is what makes it interesting-and not only as an object of study. It is the populism if not the taste of the analyst that has determined the object of attention in the first place. The sociological judgment that popular culture is important to people blurs into a critical judgment that popular culture must therefore be valuable. To use one of the buzzwords of "theory," there is a "slippage" from analysis to advocacy, defense, upward "positioning." Cultural studies often claims to have overthrown hierarchy, but what it actually does is invert it. What now certifies worthiness is the popularity of the object, not its formal qualities. If the people are on the right side, then what they like is good. This tendency in cultural studies-I think it remains the main line-lacks irony. One purports to stand four-square for the people against capitalism, and comes to echo the logic of capitalism. The consumer sovereignty touted by a capitalist society as the grandest possible means for judging merit finds a reverberation among its ostensible adversaries. Where the market flatters the individual, cultural studies flatters the group. What the group wants, buys, demands is ipso facto the voice of the people. Where once Marxists looked to factory organization as the prefiguration of "a new society in the shell of the old," today they tend to look to sovereign culture consumers. David Morley, one of the key researchers in cultural studies, and one of the most reflective, has himself deplored this tendency in recent audience studies. He maintains that to understand that "the commercial world succeeds in producing objects. . . which do connect with the lived desires of popular audiences" is "by no means necessarily to fall into the trap . . . of an uncritical celebration of popular culture." But it is not clear where to draw the line against the celebratory tendency when one is inhibited from doing so by a reluctance to criticize the cultural dispositions of the groups of which one approves. Unabashedly, the populism of cultural studies prides itself on being political. In the prevailing schools of cultural studies, to study culture is not so much to try to grasp cultural processes but to choose sides or, more subtly, to determine whether a particular cultural process belongs on the side of society's angels. An aura of hope surrounds the enterprise, the hope (even against hope) of an affirmative answer to the inevitable question: Will culture ride to the rescue of the cause of liberation? There is defiance, too, as much as hope. The discipline means to cultivate insubordination. On this view, marginalized groups in the populace continue to resist the hegemonic culture. By taking defiant popular culture seriously, one takes the defiers seriously and furthers their defiance. Cultural studies becomes "cult studs." It is charged with surveying the culture, assessing the hegemonic import of cultural practices and pinpointing their potentials for "resistance." Is this musical style or that literary form "feminist" or "authentically Latino"? The field of possibilities is frequently reduced to two: for or against the hegemonic. But the nature of that hegemony, in its turn, is usually defined tautologically: that culture is hegemonic that is promoted by "the ruling group" or "the hegemonic bloc," and by the same token, that culture is "resistant" that is affirmed by groups assumed (because of class position, gender, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and so on) to be "marginalized" or "resistant." The process of labeling is circular, since it has been predetermined whether a particular group is, in fact, hegemonic or resistant. The populism of cultural studies is fundamental to its allure, and to the political meaning its adherents find there, for cultural studies bespeaks an affirmation of popularity tout court. To say that popular culture is "worth attention" in the scholarly sense is, for cultural studies, to say something pointed: that the people who render it popular are not misguided when they do so, not fooled, not dominated, not distracted, not passive. If anything, the reverse: the premise is that popular culture is popular because and only because the people find in it channels of desire pleasure, initiative, freedom. It is this premise that gives cultural studies its aura of political engagement-or at least political consolation. To unearth reason and value, brilliance and energy in popular culture is to affirm that the people have not been defeated. The cultural student, singing their songs, analyzing their lyrics, at the same time sings their praises. However unfavorable the balance of political forces, people succeed in living lives of vigorous resistance! Are the communities of African-Americans or AfroCaribbeans suffering? Well, they have rap! (Leave aside the question of whether all of them want rap.) The right may have taken possession of 10 Downing Street, the White House, and Congress-and as a result of elections, embarrassingly enough!-but at least one is engage in cultural studies. Consolation: here is an explanation for the rise of academic cultural studies during precisely the years when the right has held political and economic power longer and more consistently than at any other time in more than a half century. Now, in effect, "the cultural is political," and more, it is regarded as central to the control of political and economic resources. The control of popular culture is held to have become decisive in the fate of contemporary societies-or at least it is the sphere in which opposition can find footing, find breathing space, rally the powerless, defy the grip of the dominant ideas, isolate the powers that be, and prepare for a "war of position" against their dwindling ramparts. On this view, to dwell on the centrality of popular culture is more than an academic's way of filling her hours; it is a useful certification of the people and their projects. To put it more neutrally, the political aura of cultural studies is supported by something like a "false consciousness" premise: the analytical assumption that what holds the ruling groups in power is their capacity to muffle, deform, paralyze, or destroy contrary tendencies of an emotional or ideological nature. By the same token, if there is to be a significant "opposition," it must first find a base in popular culture-and first also turns out to be second, third, and fourth, since popular culture is so much more accessible, so much more porous, so much more changeable than the economic and political order. With time, what began as compensation hardened-became institutionalized-into a tradition. Younger scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics. To do cultural studies, especially in connection with identity politics, was the politics they knew. The contrast with the rest of the West is illuminating. In varying degrees, left-wing intellectuals in France, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Spain and elsewhere retain energizing attachments to Social Democratic, Green, and other left-wing parties. There, the association of culture with excellence and traditional elites remains strong. But in the Anglo-American world, including Australia, these conditions scarcely obtain. Here, in a discouraging time, popular culture emerges as a consolation prize. (The same happened in Latin America, with the decline of left-wing hopes.) The sting fades from the fragmentation of the organized left, the metastasis of murderous nationalism, the twilight of socialist dreams virtually everywhere. Class inequality may have soared, ruthless individualism may have intensified, the conditions of life for the poor may have worsened, racial tensions may have mounted, unions and social democratic parties may have weakened or reached an impasse, but never mind. Attend to popular culture, study it with sympathy, and one need not dwell on unpleasant realities. One need not be unduly vexed by electoral defeats. One need not be preoccupied by the ways in which the political culture's center of gravity has moved rightward-or rather, one can put this down to the iron grip of the established media institutions. One need not even be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Is capitalism the trouble? Is it the particular form of capitalism practiced by multinational corporations in a deregulatory era? Is it patriarchy (and is that the proper term for a society that has seen an upheaval in relations between women and men in the course of a half-century)? Racism? Antidemocracy? Practitioners of cultural studies, like the rest of the academic left, are frequently elusive. Speaking cavalierly of "opposition" and "resistance" permits-rather, cultivates-a certain sloppiness of thinking, making it possible to remain "left" without having to face the most difficult questions of political selfdefinition. The situation of cultural studies conforms to the contours of our political moment. It confirms-and reinforces-the current paralysis: the incapacity of social movements and dissonant sensibilities to imagine effective forms of public engagement. It substitutes an obsession with popular culture for coherent economic-political thought or a connection with mobilizable populations outside the academy and across identity lines. One must underscore that this is not simply because of cultural studies' default. The default is an effect more than a cause. It has its reasons. The odds are indeed stacked against serious forward motion in conventional politics. Political power is not only beyond reach, but functional majorities disdain it, finding the government and all its works contemptible. Few of the central problems of contemporary civilization are seriously contested within the narrow band of conventional discourse. Unconventional politics, such as it is, is mostly fragmented and self-contained along lines of racial, gender, and sexual identities. One cannot say that cultural studies diverts energy from a vigorous politics that is already in force. Still, insofar as cultural studies makes claims for itself as an insurgent politics, the field is presumptuous and misleading. Its attempt to legitimize the ecstasies of the moment confirms the collective withdrawal from democratic hope. Seeking to find political energies in audiences who function as audiences, rather than in citizens functioning as citizens, the dominant current in cultural studies is pressed willy-nilly toward an uncritical celebration of technological progress. It offers no resistance to the primacy of visual and nonlinear culture over the literary and linear. To the contrary: it embraces technological innovation as soon as the latest developments prove popular. It embraces the sufficiency of markets; its main idea of the intellect's democratic commitment is to flatter the audience. Is there a chance of a modest redemption? Perhaps, if we imagine a harder headed, less wishful cultural studies, free of the burden of imagining itself to be a political practice. A chastened, realistic cultural studies would divest itself of political pretensions. It would not claim to be politics. It would not mistake the academy for the larger society. It would be less romantic about the world-and about itself. Rigorous practitioners of cultural studies should be more curious about the world that remains to be researched and changed. We would learn more about politics, economy, and society, and in the process, appreciate better what culture, and cultural study, do not accomplish. If we wish to do politics, let us organize groups, coalitions, demonstrations, lobbies, whatever; let us do politics. Let us not think that our academic work is already that.

Capitalism results in incalculable atrocities - this structural violence outweighs.

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23 JF)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers**). An estimated** two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

Our alternative is to return the priority of political contestation to class. The aim of our alternative makes the production of social relations, capitalism and class, the starting point for resistance and criticism.

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be seen as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the workings, movements and proﬁt levels of multinational corporations but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class conveniently draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’ (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) provide capital with its superexploited labor pools—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social relations constitutive of racialized differences are considerably shaped by the relations of production and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority, however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because class is an essentially (hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signiﬁes one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘gender, race, and ethnicity are all understood as social constructions rather than as essentialist categories’ the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one or another form of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (1) how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and (2) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system. This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach. Having a concept of class helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. This, of course, does not imply that we ignore racism and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘race’ doesn’t explain racism and forms of racial oppression. Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

### Case

#### Aff call to restrictions on war powers justifies an ever-expanding and authoritarian system of violence.

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Foucault’s envisioning of a more governmentalized and securitized modernity, framed by a ubiquitous architecture of security, speaks on various levels to the contemporary US military’s efforts in the war on terror, but I want to mention three specifically, which I draw upon through the course of the paper. First, in the long war in the Middle East and Central Asia, the US military actively seeks to legally facilitate both the ‘circulation’ and ‘conduct’ of a target population: its own troops. This may not be commonly recognized in biopolitical critiques of the war on terror but, as will be seen later, the Judge Advocate General Corps has long been proactive in a ‘juridical’ form of warfare, or lawfare, that sees US troops as ‘technical-biopolitical’ objects of management whose ‘operational capabilities’ on the ground must be legally enabled. Secondly, as I have explored elsewhere, the US military’s ‘grand strategy of security’ in the war on terror — which includes a broad spectrum of tactics and technologies of security, including juridical techniques — has been relentlessly justified by a power/knowledge assemblage in Washington that has successfully scripted a neoliberal political economy argument for its global forward presence.’9 Securitizing economic volatility and threat and regulating a neoliberal world order for the good of the global economy are powerful discursive touchstones registered perennially on multiple forums in Washington — from the Pentagon to the war colleges, from IR and Strategic Studies policy institutes to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees — and the endgame is the legitimization of the military’s geopolitical and biopolitical technologies of power overseas,20 Finally, Foucault’s conceptualization of a ‘society of security’ is marked by an urge to ‘govern by contingency’, to ‘anticipate the aleatory’, to ‘allow for the evental’.2’ It is a ‘security society’ in which the very language of security is promissory, therapeutic and appealing to liberal improvement. The lawfare of the contemporary US military is precisely orientated to plan for the ‘evental’, to anticipate a 4 series of future events in its various ‘security zones’ — what the Pentagon terms ‘Areas of Responsibility’ or ‘AORs’ (see figure 1)•fl These AORs equate, in effect, to what Foucault calls “spaces of security”, comprising “a series of possible events” that must be securitized by inserting both “the temporal” and “the uncertain”. And it is through preemptive juridical securitization ‘beyond the battlefield’ that the US military anticipates and enables the necessary biopolitical modalities of power and management on the ground for any future interventionary action. AORs and the ‘milieu’ of security For CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, and the other five US regional commanders across the globe, the population’ of primary concern in their respective AORs is the US military personnel deployed therein. For Petraeus and his fellow commanders, US ground troops present perhaps less a collection of “juridical-political” subjects and more what Foucault calls “technical- political” objects of “management and government”.25 In effect, they are tasked with governing “spaces of security” in which “a series of uncertain elements” can unfold in what Foucault terms the “milieu”.26 What is at stake in the milieu’ is “the problem of circulation and causality”, which must be anticipated and pLanned for in terms of “a series of possible events” that need to “be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework”.27 And the “technical problem” posed by the eighteenth-century town planners Foucault has in mind is precisely the same technical problem of 5 space, population and regulation that US military strategists and Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) personnel have in the twenty-first century. For US military JAGs, their endeavours to legally securitize the AORs of their regional commanders are ultimately orientated to “fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu” even before ground troops are deployed (as in the case of the first action in the war on terror, which I return to later: the negotiation by CENTCOM JAGs of a Status of Forces Agreement with Uzbekistan in early October 2OO1).2 JAGs play a key role in legally conditioning the battlefield, in regulating the circulation of troops, in optimizing their operational capacities, and in sanctioning the privilege to kill. The JAG’s milieu is a “field of intervention”, in other words, in which they are seeking to “affect, precisely, a population”.29 To this end, securing the aleatory or the uncertain is key. As Michael Dillon argues, central to the securing of populations are the “sciences of the aleatory or the contingent” in which the “government of population” is achieved by the regulation of “statistics and probability”.30 As he points out elsewhere, you “cannot secure anything unless you know what it is”, and therefore securitization demands that “people, territory, and things are transformed into epistemic objects”.3’ And in planning the milieu of US ground forces overseas, JAGs translate regional AORs into legally-enabled grids upon which US military operations take place. This is part of the production of what Matt Hannah terms “mappable landscapes of expectation”;32 and to this end, the aleatory is anticipated by planning for the ‘evental’ in the promissory language of securitization.¶ The ontology of the event’ has recently garnered wide academic engagement. Randy Martin, for example, has underlined the evental discursive underpinnings of US military strategy in the war on terror; highlighting how the risk of future events results in ‘preemption’ being the tactic of their securitization.33 Naomi Klein has laid bare the powerful event-based logic of disaster capitalism’;34 while others have pointed out how an ascendant logic of premediation’. in which the future is already anticipated and mediated”. is a marked feature of the “post-9/1 I cultural landscape”.35 But it was Foucault who first cited the import of the evental’ in the realm of biopolitics. He points to the “anti-scarcity system” of seventeenth-century Europe as an early exemplar of a new ‘evental’ biopolitics in which “an event that could take place” is prevented before it “becomes a reality”.36 To this end, the figure of ‘population’ becomes both an ‘object’, “on which and towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect on it”, but also a ‘subject’, “called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion”.37 Echoing Foucault, David Nally usefully argues that the emergence of the “era of bio-power” was facilitated by “the ability of ‘government’ to seize, manage and control individual bodies and whole populations”.38 And this is part of Michael Dillon’s argument about the “very operational heart of the security dispositif of the biopolitics of security”, which seeks to ‘strategize’, ‘secure’. ‘regulate’ and ‘manipulate’ the “circulation of species Iife”.3 For the US military, it is exactly the circulation and regulation of life that is central to its tactics of lawfare to juridically secure the necessary legal geographies and biopolitics of its overseas ground presence.

#### The affirmative claim that white authority only acts because “they did it out of the fear of the blackness they saw when they could only see my pupils.” creates a boundary between acceptable and unacceptable conceptions of the black body- turns case

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What is evidenced in these discussions is the micro-politics of power where a construction of bleaching as deviant dominates the public discourse, and boundaries are drawn between acceptable and unacceptable representations of blackness. Additionally, group boundaries are drawn between black, mentally healthy Jamaicans versus mentally enslaved bleachers. What is particularly telling is that in their condemnation of bleachers, Jamaicans expose a conception of blackness that is mapped onto the physical body. For instance, in an article in the Jamaica Observer entitled "Blacks Gone White: Bleaching Exposed Under the Sun," teen writer Zakiya McKenzie argued that people's bodies and physical structures are suited for the climate from where they originate. African bodies are built differently. Our skin is dark; this is our natural protection from the blazing sun that we would encounter in Africa. Our hair is naturally 'natty'; this is to keep it from our bodies, which would only generate unnecessary heat.39 (Emphasis added.) She further argued that since Jamaica is a hot tropical country, black skin is a natural adaptation since "the substance of our skin that makes us dark (melanin), also protects us from the [End Page 46] harmful Ultra-Violet (UV) rays of the sun."40 Here, biology is put in the service of a political conception of blackness. As she admonished bleachers, McKenzie inserted a construction of blackness in the public discourse that not only mapped it onto the physical body but also the physical landscape (where ninety percent of its inhabitants are black). The body, then, serves as a means of concretizing blackness as a biological, political and ontological reality. According to McKenzie, bleaching not only poses a health risk; it is also indicative of "African people peeling away their heritage."41 She asserts: Since melanin is governed by our genes it is not only the bleacher who suffers. Just as a crack baby is born to the fate his parents pre-ordained for him, so is it the same with a 'bleacher's baby'. More and more children will be born naked as it relates to protection from extreme heat and extreme light that we experience in Jamaica.42 Future generations of black Jamaicans are endangered by bleachers¶ and, by extension, the nation is threatened by those who would deny the biological fact of blackness. McKenzie ends with a religious argument that bleachers should stop hating themselves as the bible itself glorifies black people. Obviously, arguments against bleaching are multi-layered. They consist of religious, political and biological perspectives that cast bleaching as deviant because this practice is seen to violate popular conceptions of blackness and undermines ideas of bodies as natural and immutable. We see other examples of this. For instance, in an article in the Jamaica Observer entitled, "Black is Beautiful," teen writer Peta Gaye Mason declared that if "God had wanted them [bleachers] to have brown skin, I'm sure they would have been born with it" (emphasis added).43 The implication is that bleaching is not only a violation against nature but also God. By mapping blackness onto bodies that we are born with, the body serves as a way of reifying and essentializing it. Blackness is understood in the discourse as a natural pigmentation that one is either born with or given it by God. Associating blackness with melanin that protects the skin from the sun helps reify it in the public imagination. Imagining blackness in this way makes it appear fixed and immutable. When the body is transformed or modified, however, this concept of blackness is destabilized and efforts are made to re-center it. Public responses to skin bleaching reveal that modern articulations of blackness, or modern blackness, in Jamaica do not allow for difference among blacks. Instead, boundaries are created in [End Page 47] the discourse that mark bleached bodies as deviant, and arguments are made to resocialize the bleacher to conform to a dominant conception of blackness. The pubic discourse reveals then, that multiple expressions and embodiments of blackness including bleached (and, as Carnegie demonstrates, albino) bodies are excluded from hegemonic conceptions of blackness. This practice of exclusion undermines assumptions of blackness and identity as unifying principles at a moment in Jamaica where a racialized vision of citizenship is expanding in the public sphere to challenge structures of inequality and exclusion.

### 2nc

### Case

Nkopo & Mngxitama 13 - black consciousness activists (11 JAN 2013, ATHI-NANGAMSO ESTHER NKOPO, ANDILE MNGXITAMA, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-11-00-theres-no-unlearning-whiteness-despite-what-anti-racists-say, There's no unlearning whiteness, despite what 'anti-racists' say)

It's the tragic black celebration of her "acknowledgment" of her white privileges that calls for critical reflection on the new "anti-racism" industry by white liberals such as Professor Samantha Vice, Michelle Booth and now Schutte. Basically, they are struggling to live with the legacy of brutality and racism that brought them about and positions them as privileged. They want to be ethical, that is to say be good people of good conscience, so as to properly enjoy their good white lives alongside their black lovers and children. It would be amiss for black people to ride this wave towards rescuing whiteness when a long history and present of white supremacy prove whiteness to be unethical and beyond restructuring. This appeal that white people again admit guilt, ask forgiveness and we can simply move on on the basis of "common humanity" is consistent with the post-1994 reconciliation without justice exemplified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's impulse of getting some perpetrators of racism to repent, reveal and ask forgiveness, and thus gain moral vindication for the white race. We saw former death squad leader Eugene de Kock going to jail and former police minister Adriaan Vlok washing the feet of Reverend Frank Chikane in a macabre performance of remorse that leaves the anti-black status quo intact. Essentially this "anti-racism" industry appeals to whites to be nice about their whiteness and white supremacy, and not rub it in black people's faces after black people have been nice enough to let whites stay and prosper on land stolen from them. Schutte wants whites to relax because blacks have no ill intention towards them despite all that has happened in the past. The paternalism and racism of this empty acknowledgment of history but not redress gives blacks a false sense of justice and it is growing fast, expressed in some whites boldly wearing T-shirts with the words: "I benefited from apartheid." This individualisation of racism has immediate benefits for the "anti-racists" who accuse other whites of racism – miraculously, by this act, she or he transcends racism and its benefits, and becomes the national spokesperson on race matters and a fêted darling of the media. Blacks are hungry for any acknowledgement of white guilt, even if it's given half-heartedly or as an act of bad faith for both commercial and psychological benefit for the white "confessor". The "anti-racist" activists have seen an opening in the market and are moving in on it. It makes better sense if one married a black man and had "mixed" children, who are mentioned in between as if it mattered. Critical race studies Tragically, South Africa has not even moved past the first-generation "critical race studies" that populated North America at one point. It has gone through the "race traitor" period, where whites were seriously trying to come to terms with what it means to be white in a world that is structured on the permanent exclusion and oppression of blacks. Such studies and campaigns soon came to a cul-de-sac when it was discovered that there was no rescuing whiteness that is not based on continued black oppression. Anti-racism by whites became exposed as sophisticated racism. The only solution was the expulsion of whites from black affairs. This is a major test, because white anti-racism activities will have to take Malcolm X's injunction that the best help that whites can give blacks is to do "nothing". Some black supporters of Schutte have distorted Steve Biko's injunction that whites who want to help blacks must work among their own community. But this couldn't possibly mean rescuing whiteness under the guise of working against it. Schutte's biggest sin is the distortion of what racism is: she reduces it to personal misunderstanding and mere bad orientation that can be cured by changed behaviour and admission of guilt. To end racism, actually, would be to realise the Armageddon that those whites Schutte derides for being paranoid know awaits in some historical corner. It can't be otherwise, given the magnitude of historical transgression against blacks. The coming apocalypse was best described in JM Coetzee's Disgrace. To his credit Coetzee left the country because he knows, like Lucy in the novel, that whites have to start from the beginning with nothing – like dogs. This kind of thinking offends liberals like Schutte, who just want a little bit of acknowledgment. Because Schutte and Co can go through life innocent until proven guilty, get intuitive access to property and land, and escape police harassment, they cannot isolate that privilege to being the burden of good whites as though it does not translate to black oppression and marginalisation. In this regard there's no unlearning whiteness. Schutte's "each one teach one" training on whites resolving racism for blacks is unintelligible and disingenuous. The essence of white being, its intrinsic link to domination and privilege, is what needs to be destroyed and the possibility of its structural superiority is what must be ended. Some may think it is unreasonable to ask white people to tutor each other towards this goal - but for black people there can be no lesser demand if white supremacy is to end. It is a demand we know won't be met. Whenever white privilege has been questioned in South Africa it has felt victimised and retaliated with its power to take up space. Nonetheless, this is a demand we should put into effect by any means necessary. Black political interest cannot bow to the moral persuasion of "white angels" like Schutte. They won't resolve racism, but will only reposition whites to a place where they can think of themselves as ethical. This does not include them ending their white world so we can be human. Blacks are a majority and we must use our numeral strength and sense of injustice to end white supremacy. The ANC has served us badly and left us to the whims of all sorts of white paternalism.

### Cap

Syptomn politics think they do nothing

Burris 10 Greg, writer; “Coping with Capitalism” *Dissident Voice*; April 14, 2010; http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/04/coping-with-capitalism/

The most famous part of Frantz Fanon’s classic 1961 text The Wretched of the Earth is its powerful first chapter, “Concerning Violence,” a hard-hitting call to arms against the injustice and exploitation of European colonialism. What often goes unnoticed from the book is the series of anecdotes presented in its final pages: case studies of patients that came to Fanon seeking psychiatric help during Algeria’s bloody struggle for independence. Particularly notable is the story of a 30-year-old French police inspector, married with three children, who spent his days torturing Algerian prisoners and his nights plagued by terrible dreams and violent impulses towards his family. He first sought therapy after sadistically tying his wife to a chair and beating her. The offense? She had protested his physical abuse of their 20-month-old infant. ¶ The solution to the torturer’s problem is immediately obvious: stop torturing. Indeed, one does not have to be a Sigmund Freud to connect the dots linking his abuse of loved ones back to his grisly occupation. The French torturer, however, did not resign from his day job. Instead, he continued working full-time while in Fanon’s care and had no apparent intention of quitting. This was not, as one might surmise, a result of denial. Indeed, the police inspector was not blind to the fact that his job was the source of his violent tendencies. As Fanon reported, “This man knew perfectly well that his disorders were directly caused by the kind of activity that went on inside the rooms where interrogations were carried out.” Nevertheless, the patient asked Fanon “to help him to go on torturing Algerian patriots without any prickling of conscience, without any behavior problems and with complete equanimity.”1 In other words, the French torturer only wanted help finding an effective coping strategy for dealing with the side-effects of his hideous vocation.¶ The case of Fanon’s mentally disturbed torturer has many parallels in modern society. Today there seems to be a great tendency for people suffering from the side-effects of certain activities to treat the negative symptoms without bothering to evaluate their cause. This includes the use of prescribed medication both to lose weight and to calm down those children who do not get the attention they need. In this way, we are allowed to mindlessly continue on with the same damaging practices and life-styles that caused our initial complaints to begin with.¶ A similar observation has often been made by Slavoj Žižek who sees a striking paradox in the capitalist marketplace. In The Puppet and the Dwarf, for instance, he writes, “On today’s market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol.”2 There is a direct parallel here between Fanon’s torturer and current market trends; both represent attempts at treating the symptom without dealing with its causes. What seems to be lost on those who partake in such easy (but ultimately empty) solutions is that by removing the harmful contents from harmful products we tend to forget that those harmful products are perhaps best not consumed in the first place.¶ This detachment of the symptom from its cause can also result in a failure to recognize that the two were ever connected. As Žižek has pointed out, “The ultimate example [of this trend] is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the USA, with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! (that is, of the very thing that causes constipation).”3 Indeed, did not this exact situation arise when, after the tragic September 11 attacks, President Bush sidestepped the issue of the economic grievances that had led to that atrocity and instead provided the American public with his own chocolate laxative, an instruction to consume: “Get on board. Do your business around the country. Fly and enjoy America’s great destination spots. Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life the way we want it to be enjoyed.”4 ¶ Of course, the Bush administration had no stranglehold on such ill-conceived remedies, and indeed, in the context of US politics, the championing of chocolate laxative solutions is a bipartisan affair. Thus, the catastrophic 2008 financial meltdown was dealt with by inundating the money mismanagers who caused it with even more money, redistributing public wealth into private hands on a massive scale. Likewise, the Obama administration’s strategy for taming the abusive practices of for-profit health insurance companies has been to secure even more customers for that industry, making the purchase of private insurance mandatory for all citizens. In both of these cases, the cause of our problems is presented as the solution.¶ This same idea might also apply to all of those frightening tales of US veterans who turn their war-time instincts upon their loved ones after returning home. Most recently, a soldier in Washington State was accused of submitting his four-year-old daughter to water torture for failing to recite her ABCs.5 Such cases are typically treated as monstrous and inexplicable aberrations — the doings of a few “bad apples” — rather than as byproducts of the standard operating procedure. So ingrained is this theme in the popular imagination that it has formed the plotline of several examples of Hollywood cinema. Notable here is Brothers (2009), a film in which the character of Captain Sam Cahill, played by Tobey Maguire, returns from Afghanistan a changed man. Before entering the war, he had represented the all-American ideal: his father’s favorite son, the head of a happy family, the husband of a beautiful wife, and the father of two lovely girls. In short, he was an upstanding citizen, living a life of luxury in a large, comfortable home in small town USA. After being captured, tortured, and forced to murder his friend by a smarmy group of vile Afghan terrorists, he returns to his consumerist paradise unstable and unfriendly, paranoid and ready at any moment to crack. The war apparently served as the great corrupter.¶ Not surprisingly, Brothers ends on a positive note with Cahill receiving what appears to be beneficial psychiatric treatment. Conspicuously absent from the film is any connection between the various wars out there with the social structures back home. To the contrary, therapy serves as a method of bringing Cahill back into the fold of normality without acknowledging that this normality caused the war in the first place. Thus, the film does not recognize that its two diametrically opposed spheres — the Cahill family’s life of luxury and the death and destruction in Afghanistan — are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. As with Žižek’s chocolate laxative, Brothers suggests that the remedy to the symptom is indulging even more in its cause.¶ This is, of course, not to say that therapy does not work. To the contrary, therapeutic practices like meditation, religious experience, and spirituality can, in fact, serve as effective coping methods. But this is precisely what makes them so dangerous. By soothing our symptomatic aches, these treatments act as a kind of anesthetic, dulling the pain and diverting our attention away from the systemic causes of our unpleasant maladies. As Dana Cloud put it in her study Control and Consolation in American Culture and Politics, “the therapeutic […] dislocates political conflicts onto individuals or families, privatizes both the experience of oppression and possible modes of resistance to it, and translates political questions into psychological issues to be resolved through personal, psychological change.”6 Thus, while therapy may indeed deliver instant gratification, such remedies remain incredibly short-sighted as long as they address problems only at the level of the individual and do not point towards the larger, structural causes behind the bothersome symptoms.¶ What happens, then, if we take these observations yet a step further and apply them to the realm of politics? Does the same lesson not also pertain to typical attitudes towards the global “war on terror”? If our wars abroad are, by themselves, the cause of our various societal ills, then we just simply need to get out. While the general call for withdrawal is one that all who are concerned for human life should wholeheartedly endorse, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Blaming the war entirely for today’s various problems is far too easy, and such a diagnosis acts to obscure the raw truth that merely withdrawing from Afghanistan or Iraq without also addressing those wars’ structural causes will do nothing to prevent the next conflict. Indeed, to treat the wars simply as a misguided policy decision or as a monstrous aberration serves only to hide the sinister reality that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were, in fact, created by the political and economic structures of our very own society. Ignoring this while simultaneously indulging in the happy consumerist fantasy would be tantamount to treating constipation with Žižek’s chocolate laxative. The path to war begins at home, and we must recognize that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are also symptoms — symptoms of the capitalist empire.¶ Thus, in the same way that Fanon’s torturer wanted to carry on with his business of torturing, just without the bothersome nightmares, does not the liberal anti-war movement today seek to carry on with the business of capitalism, just without its malignant symptoms? Indeed, the economic disparities and grievances that lie behind many of the globe’s acts of violence — both by states and by terrorists — are never really addressed. To do so would, in fact, require a fundamental rethinking of the capitalist fabric of the US state, something nobody within the system is willing to do. To truly address these issues would require that we treat the cause of the symptoms rather than just the symptoms. Or, to put it another way, if we want to end the wars that are caused by capitalism, we must work to overturn the capitalist system itself. Just like those people who think they can lose weight merely by gorging on “healthy” junk food and just like Fanon’s torturer who wanted to cure his nightmares through therapy, those who today believe they can continue to enjoy their capitalist cake and eat it too — just without the unpleasantries of terrorism, torture, and war — are only kidding themselves.

There an accessibility DA to their interp and a net benefit to ours

Mills 7 - Northwestern University (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_speculative\_philosophy/v021/21.3.mills.html, Charles W. Comments on Shannon Sullivan's Revealing Whiteness)

Finally, apart from the question of the identity under which this antiracist self- and social transformation is to be carried out, there are the other questions of the mechanics and motivation of the transformation itself. Whether as a “Euro-American” or an “antiwhitely white,” one's seeking to remake oneself requires more than simple declaration (however well intentioned) or subjective volition. The whole point of the “social ontology” perspective on race, as Sullivan demonstrates in the book, is that race does in fact come to constitute one's self, as an objective matter, so that these social causes, and their internalization by the psyche and body, will have to be addressed and combated, especially difficult considering their penetration into the unconscious. “Merely having good intentions” is not enough: “the hidden, subversive operations of unconscious habits require indirect, roundabout strategies for transformation. . . . [C]hanging unconscious habits of white privilege requires altering the political, social, physical, economic, psychological, aesthetic, and other environments that ‘feed’ them” (Sullivan 2006, 9). Changing the habits and dispositions that make one whitely will require one to change one's life, to begin to live in a radically different kind of way. This would obviously be demanding enough on its own, considering how persuasively Sullivan has demonstrated that we are made up by habit and the ways in which these habits are continually being reinforced by the “transactions” with and “messages” from a world that continues to be structured by an overarching whiteness. But once one takes into account the “material” (in the Marxist sense) factors I have cited, the task becomes even more overwhelming, for it becomes clear that it is not merely a matter of “habits” entrenched by routine but “habits” that are underwritten by a material payoff —habits, as I pointed out earlier, that are rooted in a political economy of systemic racial advantage. Think, for example, of the financial consequences for a white couple and their family of buying a house in one neighborhood rather than another, of sending their children to one school rather than another, of endorsing one kind of racial public policy rather than another. So it is not only the discomfort of having to change your life that has to be dealt with, in terms of the disincentives of abandoning the comfortable and familiar for the strange and unknown, but also the possible material losses ensuing therefrom in a competitive capitalist society. Marx and Engels hoped and anticipated that some bourgeois intellectuals, at least, would rally to their [End Page 228] cause (unsurprisingly, considering their own class origins), but they certainly did not put their faith in large sections of the property-owning class themselves coming to [control] the barricades. So again, we see a crucial point of differentiation with the socialist analysis and prognosis: the workers (Marx and Engels thought, rightly or wrongly) were on their way to becoming the vast majority, and the workers are supposed to have nothing to lose but their chains. But in the United States, the majority are privileged by their whiteness, not disadvantaged, and across-the-board antiwhiteliness will involve real costs for oneself and one's family. What motivation would one have as a typical white person for choosing to embark on a path of such sacrifice? Can moral motivation—the imperative of social justice—be sufficient? Or will it have to be supplemented by other kinds of considerations also? Can a plausible case be made, can an attractive political project be devised, that will show the material benefits of such a transformation for the white majority? Will the case have to be made in terms of benefits of other kinds? Or does it require, as the traditional Left would claim, a linking of the antiwhiteliness struggle to the anticapitalism or maybe (more cautiously and reformist) the anti–“inegalitarian capitalism” struggle?4

#### **No perms in performance debates.**

Evans 13 - Debate Guru (Rashad, https://www.facebook.com/groups/318979761518379/permalink/542109029205450/, October 14th 2013)

Rashad Evans: Counter performances are always competitive. Performance based framework recognizes that there is always a forced choice between the the two teams and the ballot can only be awarded to one team. This is why permutations are problematic. Therefore, if the negative offers up a performance of there own with its own benefits that are more beneficial. The affirmative cannot say: we permute your performance because we could have done that too. In addition, while I loathe role of the ballot arguments, they immediately set of competition in the same way that plan focus does because it identifies what the debate must be about which always allows the negative to say this debate should be about X. You say the role of the ballot is who best X; we say the role of the ballot is who best challenges Y.

### 1nr

#### Procedural rules aren’t censorship or violence – they are necessary for a productive debate and the only consequence is you lose, which just incentivizes better arguments.

Armstrong 2k—Paul, Dean and Professor of Literature at Brown University, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser’s Aesthetic Theory,” New Literature History, pg 211–223

The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codiﬁed as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more ﬂexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity. As a rule-governed but open-ended activity, play provides a model for deploying power in a nonrepressive manner that makes creativity and innovation possible not in spite of disciplinary constraints but because of them. Not all power is playful, of course, and some restrictions are more coercive than enabling. But thinking about the power of constraints on the model of rules governing play helps to explain the paradox that restrictions can be productive rather than merely repressive. Seeing constraints as structures for establishing a play-space and as guides for practices of exchange within it envisions power not necessarily and always as a force to be resisted in the interests of freedom; it allows imagining the potential for power to become a constructive social energy that can animate games of to-and-fro exchange between participants whose possibilities for self-discovery and self-expansion are enhanced by the limits shaping their interactions.

Topic Specific education good – Yes in theory they can win that drones are bad, but they fail to engage in questions of war powers and how restrictions affect the president. Inevitably we will learn about US policies, but legal focus is key to expand applicable research skills and prevent stale education

Topp & Bricker ‘10 (Sarah – prof @Trinity & Bret – U of Kansas “SUPPLYING A WELL-ROUNDED EDUCATION: A CASE FOR MANDATORY TOPIC ROTATION” http://www.cedadebate.org/cad/index.php/CAD/article/view/270/242

Mandatory topic rotation would guarantee that students achieve depth of education on a diversity of areas. Mandating a new topic area each year means that a four- year debater will have in-depth knowledge of four different areas of controversy. It is true that absent compulsory rotation, students still learn about several topic areas, but with forced rotation, there will likely be a larger variety of topics discussed. Crucially, each student will be exposed to issues relevant to foreign policy, domestic policy, and in stale education. A mandatory rotation ensures that students are exposed to a large variety of literature bases, and therefore expand their research skills. Debaters’ research skills already tend to be far ahead of their non-debate peers in college. However, some debaters can currently go their entire college career searching a database or source unrelated to domestic or legal issues. In particular, the focus on foreign policy and avoidance of legal policy has limited the research bases to which debaters are exposed. A topic rotation changes the types of databases and searches done because some databases are more relevant and useful for some topics than they are for others. The result is that students will experience and benefit from working with different interfaces and reading a variety of academic genres. Such exposure will make them more well-rounded debaters and students and better prepare them for life in the law, academia, and other professions.